This study explores the constitutional role, embedded in the Constitution, of the Senate of Pakistan as a chamber of provinces and appraises its legislative and non-legislative policy work it performed as a federal second chamber in the years between 2012 and 2018. The Senate lies in the heart of the federal parliament where it not only oversees the policies of the federal government but also complements the National Assembly in legislative deliberations and policy debates. The primary constitutional role of the Senate is to advance the concerns of the provinces at federal level. Yet its territorial role as a chamber of provinces is relatively less understood. A very few research studies rendered on the subject do little mention of the legislative and non-legislative policy work of the Senate. This study not only explores the constitutional role of the Senate but also appraises its manifestation in the legislative business transacted during the period in focus. The study employs an exploratory-analytical approach, along with blend of qualitative and quantitative methods.
The Constitution Pakistan, 1973 introduced a bicameral federal parliament where the National Assembly represents the principle of population, whereas the Senate represents the principle of territory. The population based representation of the provinces is provided in the Assembly whereas the Senate provides equal regional representation to all provinces irrespective of their demographic size. The Assembly is elected directly on the principle of one person one vote, whereas the senators are elected indirectly by the Provincial Assemblies. The Senate enjoys co-equal legislative powers with that of the Assembly except for the financial powers that rest with the latter only.
For assessing the extent of the effectiveness with which the Senate performs its role as a federal second chamber, it is necessary to understand the broader institutional environment in which it operates. The present study argues that the predominance of the Assembly in the parliamentary procedures combined with the majoritarian parliamentary regime type undermines and substantially influences the performance of the senators as the representatives of the provinces. Based on evidences, the study infers that amongst other impeding factors, it is party discipline that played an adverse role in affecting the legislative behavior of the senators during the period under study. Predictions aside, it is hoped that the present study will generate a debate on varied aspects of the contemporary Senate. It may be of help to parliamentarians, political parties, voluntary organizations and the general public alike.